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Abstract
Trial-based tournament is a widespread hiring mechanism in organizations. Upon a job open-
ing, an applicant is tried out at the job, then swaps with another competing applicant, and so on,
with each non-competing worker holding the same position across trials. The job is o¤ered to the
applicant whose trial has had the most positive e¤ect on the organizations output. We formalize
this tournament model, deriving measures of relative performance that can be used to rank work-
ers for each job and assess their comparative advantage when absolute performance cannot be
observed. As a second goal, we study the relationship between tournament rank and earnings as
determined by marginal productivity. We show that pay is a weakly increasing function of tour-
nament rank, and we characterize organizations for which pay strictly reects tournament rank
and vice-versa. These organizations are linear and top-down biased, and they strictly include the
popular class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations. The analysis implies that hierarchical
organizations that promote fairness in pay should not have too many layers.
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1 Introduction
Trial-based tournament is a widespread mechanism used by managers, coaches and team leaders
to make decisions on hiring, ring and promotion, and to organize labor. Our goal in this paper
is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of this tournament, deriving specic measures of
relative performance that can be used to rank workers for each job and assess their comparative
advantage when absolute performance cannot be observed. Second, we study the relationship between
tournament rank and earnings as determined by marginal productivity. The analysis provides a
characterization of organizations for which earnings strictly reect tournament rank.
A trial-based tournament is a hiring model that pits workers against each other. Upon a job
opening, an applicant is tried out at the job, and swaps with another competing applicant, and so
on, with each non-competing employee keeping the same role across trials. The job is o¤ered to
the applicant whose trial has had the most positive e¤ect on the organizations output. This hiring
mechanism is used when it is di¢ cult, a priori, to predict the performance of a worker or how well
he will t within an organization. It is used by such organizations as soccer teams, manufactures,
law rms, academic institutions, and governmental institutions.
We model this hiring process as a generalized ladder tournament. We consider an organization
with a nite number of (potential) workers and jobs. Jobs are ranked based on their importance
or prestige. Workers compete for higher-ranked jobs as follows. Consider two individuals p and q
who desire to ll an open position indexed r in an organization. These workers initially occupy a
lower-ranked position s.2 We say that p beats q in position r relative to position s if aggregate
output increases more as a result of moving p from s to r than moving q from s to r no matter how
the other members of the organization are allocated to tasks. If p beats q in each position relative
to positions that are lower-ranked, we say that p is globally more inuential or productive than q.
Our model has several advantages. It yields task-specic measures of relative performance that
we use to rank workers for each job. These ordinal measures can therefore be used to make decisions
on hiring, ring, and promotion. They can also be used to assess the comparative advantage of
each worker in a job. In fact, if a worker p dominates another worker q in a job r relative to a
lower-ranked job s, it implies that q dominates p in s relative to r. This implication means that if p
has a comparative advantage over q in r relative to s, then q has a comparative advantage over p in
s relative to r. This is true, even if p has absolute advantage over q in both r and s.
Another appeal of the ordinal measures of productivity generated by our model is that they can
be used to compare workers even when their absolute productivity cannot be observed. In certain
organizations like soccer teams which involve complex social interactions and externalities in the
production process, it might be extremely di¢ cult to measure the real performance of a player or
his contribution to a victory or a defeat. In such organizations, measures of relative productivity
are needed to compare workers. For instance, assume that p and q are two strikers. If the team
always wins whenever p plays and q does not, and loses or draws when q replaces p, we will say,
following our approach to evaluating relative performance, that p is a better striker than q. But
2 If s is a job within the organization, then p and q are current employees executing identical tasks and competing
for a promotion to r, and if s is a position outside of the organization, then p and q are outside candidates competing
for r.
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in reality, it is possible that p is not "intrinsically" more skilled than q. It may just be that p
is a better teammate able to motivate other players. As a consequence, the latter perform better
when they play with p than when they play with q. It may also be that other players dislike q
and sabotage his performance by not passing him the ball when he is in a favorable position to
score, hence making him look a bad striker. All these scenarios and others are possible, but still,
we care only about a players e¤ect on the aggregate output, as we cannot observe his inputs. In
this sense, our comparative measure of productivity is really a measure of how a worker ts nicely
into a given role within an organization, or a measure of how desirable or inuential a worker is in
a role within a group. In general, it is impossible to observe all the social interactions going on in
a real-world organization, or their consequences on individual productivity, but it is easy to observe
the output of the organization. Our methodology shows how a tournament can be designed in order
to compare workers only by observing aggregate output. It follows that although individual inputs
may not be totally observable, pitting workers against one another provides incentives to put forth
su¢ cient e¤ort to outperform competitors, which alleviates or eliminates problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection. This enhances the appeal of our tournament model and conrms the several
advantages of relative comparisons that have been acknowledged in the literature, especially in the
context of tournament theory.
Although relative comparisons have several advantages, we know from Green and Stokey (1983)
that there may be signicant drawbacks from throwing away cardinal information on workersper-
formance. For this reason, as the second goal of the paper, we study the relationship between
tournament rank (a measure of relative productivity) and earnings as determined by marginal pro-
ductivity (or any monotonic transformation of marginal productivity). Marginal productivity indeed
contain important information on a workers absolute performance. Our analysis can therefore be
viewed as trying to reconcile ordinal and cardinal theories of worker productivity. This analysis is
challenging in environments like ours, where the production process involves complex social interac-
tions and externalities. Just as in chain productions, a workers performance is contingent upon the
ability of other workers to deliver. This reality does not only pose a technical problem as to how
to measure marginal productivity, but it also complicates the analysis of the relationship between
relative productivity and earnings. The analysis also shows how having a comparative advantage in
a job relative to a lower-ranked job predicts a workers pay.
Comparisons of ordinal and cardinal concepts are in line with tournament theory. Our measures
of relative productivity tell if a worker is more productive or desirable than another worker, but does
not tell by how much the former outperforms the latter. On the other hand, a cardinal measure of
compensation determines the wage gap between two workers. By comparing ordinal and cardinal
measures, one only cares about whether a higher-ranked worker in a tournament earns more. As
put by Lazear (1995), the "tournament model, taken literally, implies that the wage that goes to a
vice-president is independent of the amount by which he exceeds the performance of the assistant
vice president in winning the job." (p. 26).
In organizations in which absolute performance is hard to measure, the Shapley value is the only
available theory that measures marginal productivity.3 It was proposed by Shapley (1953) as a way
3We note that several other values have been proposed in the literature, including, for instance, the Banzhaf value,
the Johnson value, the Holler-Packel value, the Andjiga-Berg value, and the Owen value. Of all these other values, only
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of redistributing revenue in organizations that have only two levels of participation. It has since been
widely studied and generalized to t other types of environments (see, for example, Aumann and
Shapley (1974), Roth (1988), Laruelle and Valenciano (2001), Holler and Owen (2001), Leech (2003),
Freixas (2005a), Serrano (2013), and the references therein). The Shapley value as a compensation
scheme is justied if workers true inputs cannot be observed, and the only observed variable is
aggregate outcome like in our model. The generalization of the Shapley value by Freixas (2005a)
shows that it might also be used to redistribute revenue in a context where allocation of workers to
tasks is somewhat random, maybe due to exogenous factors, or due to the fact that the production
function is not entirely known to the manager so that experimentation in labor allocation becomes
useful to determine the optimal allocation of workers to the tasks. We adapt this generalization to
our context, and examine how a workers pay reects his rank as determined by our tournament
model.
We nd that earnings as given by the Shapley value only weakly reect tournament rank. If two
workers have the same rank, then they earn the same wage. If one worker has a higher rank than
the other, the former will not earn less than the latter, but they may be treated identically. So a
violation of the fairness principle in compensation is possible in certain organizations.
Our main result is the characterization of a large class of organizations in which a workers pay
strictly reects his productivity rank. Such organizations have a linear and biased structure in that
they discriminate between workers only in case of promotion to the top level or in case of ring.4
Importantly, this class of organizations includes well-known subclasses, such as organizations whose
production functions are von Neumann-Morgenstern. It also includes the class of organizations with
three layers in the hierarchy. We note that this class of organizations can be a viewed as a superset
of the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations.
Studies have noted that some workers earn more than their marginal product and others earn
less (Lazear (1995), Gabaix and Landier (2008)). We wonder whether there exist other revenue
sharing mechanisms that agree with our measures of relative productivity but do not necessarily
reect marginal contributions like the Shapley value. We show that there exist innitely many
transformations of the Shapley value that reect tournament rank, and that either redistribute
income away from workers at higher levels towards those below them such as in a progressive tax
system, or alternatively increase the income gap across the layers of hierarchy consistent with the
notion of prize spread in tournament theory. When income is redistributed to achieve more equality,
this redistribution does not alter income rank, and so it does not make a less productive worker richer
than a more productive worker, which is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle (Sen (1973)).
On the other hand, the notion of prize spread in tournament theory, which is consistent with large
wage increases upon promotions, arguably motivates workers at each level of the hierarchy and those
at lower levels.
the Banzhaf value has been extended to a framework similar to ours by Freixas (2005b). In results not shown here,
we compare our tournament ranking to the Banzhaf value and nd similar results as for the Shapley value (results
are available and will be included upon request). We have chosen not to include this result in the present paper for
expositional purposes and to keep the paper brief. Our focus on the Shapley value is also justied by the fact that
it is the most popular notion of revenue redistribution in organizations, whereas the Banzhaf value is mostly used in
political institutions to measure power.
4As noted above, we also nd that the Banzhaf value of a worker reects his tournament rank in the class of linear
and top-bottom biased organizations (again, results are available and will be included upon request).
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1.1 Contribution to the Related Literature
We propose a simple model of a ladder tournament that relies on job trial to rank workers even
when their absolute performance is hard to observe. Some, but not all, of the performance relations
derived from our tournament model generalize to hierarchical organizations the well-known inuence
relation (Isbell (1958), Taylor and Zwicker (1999), Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002)). Our paper
provides a new application and interpretation of this notion in the context of market organizations.
Also, our comparative approach to the problem of evaluating relative productivity shares similar
motivations with tournament theory, which essentially consists of pitting one worker against the
other while ensuring that the physical environment in which they compete is identical (Lazear (1995),
Lazear and Rosen (1981)). However, our approach di¤ers signicantly in its formalization, analysis,
and practical implications. In particular, in our model, workers are not promoted based on their
performance in the current job as is the case in standard tournament models. Within our framework,
a worker is tried out at the job he wants to get while the other competing worker is kept in the initial
position, and both swap roles afterwards. It is only after these trials that one worker is promoted
based on a comparison of aggregate outputs. Also, scholars worry that standard tournament setups
might lead workers to cooperate less as they are competing for the same slot, which would generally
hurt productivity (e.g., Dye (1984)). A distinctive feature of our comparative approach however is in
minimizing the potential for such conicts. For instance, outside candidates competing for a position
of assistant professor are usually invited to campus to be vetted separately. In this case, there is no
potential for conict that would hurt the department. The same holds for most sports teams and
many other types of rms.
Relative comparisons have several advantages that have been acknowledged in the literature (e.g.,
Lazear (1995), Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990)). Lazear (1995) argues that "much of the essence of
personnel economics depends on relative comparisons rather than on absolute ones." (p. 3). Indeed,
comparisons are used in important decisions such as awarding tenure, hiring, ring, promoting, and
structuring worker compensation. Several scholars also argue that relative comparisons are better
than absolute comparisons in many contexts (e.g., Lazear (1995), Devaro (2006)). With respect to
promotion, Lazear (1995) argues that a worker gets promoted in a rm not necessarily by being
"good", but by outperforming his peers. As a result, relative comparisons can also be used to
incentivize workers by inducing them to work harder to win a promotion. Most importantly, relative
comparisons rather than absolute comparisons are key when inputs are not easily observable, and
when productivity may be a¤ected by common factors that workers cannot control. As Lazear (1995)
puts it:
"...it may be easier to observe relative position than it is to observe absolute position....
Second relative comparisons di¤erence out common noise that risk-averse workers may
not like. For example, two salespeople may have a very poor day, not because they did
not put forth su¢ cient e¤ort but because the economy was bad, a condition over which
they had no control. If relative compensation is used, the e¤ect of the economy is the
same on both individuals and so the individual who performs better will still end up
receiving the higher level of compensation." (p. 25-26).
However, as already acknowledged, ignoring cardinal information may have signicant drawbacks
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(Green and Stokey (1983)), which is why we study the relationship between our performance rela-
tion and the Shapley value, which is a cardinal measure of worker productivity. Because the Shapley
value also measures worker pay, our analysis can be viewed as a contribution to the literature on
the relationship between wage and productivity. A cardinal result in neoclassical production theory
states that a worker earns the value of his marginal productivity in a competitive economy. As in-
tuitive as this result is, its underlying assumptions, including the continuity and the di¤erentiability
of the production function, make its applicability to our discrete and externality-prone environment
di¢ cult. Lazear (1995) argues that while such assumptions enable rigorous analyses, they are gen-
erally made for convenience and do not always reect the real world. In particular, the treatment
of labor as a continuous variable in standard production models implies that workers are perfect
substitutes, which in turn implies that di¤erent tasks or jobs in an organization are "equivalent",
making it unimportant to account for their role in the determination of wage. To this e¤ect, Lazear
(1995) writes:
"The neoclassical theory of production gives no explicit role of jobs. Firms hire labor,
combine it with capital, and produce output according to some production function.
Labor is treated as a continuous variable. Furthermore the description of specic tasks
assigned to a given worker is no less vague. This traditional view contrasts sharply with
the way that managers view the rm. Human resources managers think in terms of slots
or jobs, and think of these slots or jobs as being fundamental to the organization of the
rm." (p. 77)
Our framework highlights the role of jobs as advocated by Lazear (1995), whose view is also
consistent with other studies showing that jobs play an important role in the determination of wage
(Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a), Gibbons and Waldman (2006)), independently of the role of
human capital (Mincer (1974)). In particular, the huge within-rm wage disparities between CEOs
and other workers have attracted increasing attention (e.g., Gabaix and Landier (2008)), with some
scholars even acknowledging that CEOspay exceeds any measure of their marginal product (Lazear
(1995)). In line with this literature, we show that there exist innitely many transformations of the
Shapley value that respect productivity rank, and that increase the income gap across the layers of
hierarchy consistent with the notion of prize spread.
Our characterization of organizations in which tournament rank predicts earnings based on mar-
ginal productivity is new. Indeed, this characterization introduces a new class of organizations, which
are linear and top-down biased. The analysis shows that in such organizations, workers who have
a comparative advantage in higher-ranked jobs receive greater pay. It is an extremely large class,
with the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations being a proper subset. It also includes
the popular class of three-layer organizations, such as academic departments where faculty mem-
bers are either full, associate or assistant professors. The ndings have implications for the design
of organizations that promote fairness in worker compensation. It implies that fairness-promoting
organizations should not have too many layers.
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1.2 Plan
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of a discrete
multi-task organization. In Section 3, we propose a model of tournament based worker trial, and
obtain the inuence relations as a rule for ranking workers in such a tournament. In Section 4, we
analyze the relationship between tournament rank and earnings as measured by the Shapley value,
and characterize organizations for which the two concepts are ordinally equivalent. In Section 5,
we show that our wage-productivity rank-order equivalence results continue to hold under innitely
many measures of income that do not reect marginal productivity. We also discuss and conclude
our study. We collect all the proofs in Section 6 to ensure clarity and readability.
2 Hierarchical Multi-Task Organizations
In this section, we introduce the notion of a multi-task organization. A multi-task organization is
a list (N;T; f) where N is a non-empty nite set of workers, T = fT1; :::; Tjg a nite collection
of nite sets of tasks with cardinality jT j = j  2, and f : TN  ! R a real-valued production
function dened on the set of all task proles TN . More precisely, for every k = 1; :::j, Tk is a set
of identical tasks. Denote by k a representative task of Tk. We will call all tasks in Tk tasks of type
k. x = (x1; x2; ::; xn) 2 TN denotes a task prole of N where xi is the task type of worker i. The
function f maps each allocation x of workers to the tasks into a real number which measures the
aggregate output f(x) of the organization.
We note that for any organization (N;T; f), T1 might be viewed as the set of positions outside
of the organization, so that any individual lling such a position is not an employee within the
organization. If all individuals are in outside positions, this constitutes a situation of "inaction" for
the organization, the corresponding task or labor allocation is x = (1; 1; :::; 1) and f(x) = 0. Let y
be a real number. We denote by Q(y) the set of all task allocations x such that f(x) = y.
In certain organizations, tasks or roles are ordered in degree of "importance" or "prestige." We say
that such organizations are hierarchical. More formally, a hierarchical organization is a list (N;T; f)
where type T1 tasks are less important than type T2 tasks, type T2 tasks less important than type
T3 tasks, and so on. We say that T is the organization ladder or hierarchy, and its elements are
the layers or levels of the hierarchy. An organization in which tasks are not ordered is said to be
non-hierarchical.
The notion of task "importance" has an important corollary in certain hierarchical organizations.
It implies that if a worker were to move from a less important task to a more important task, then
aggregate output would (weakly) increase as a result. This corresponds to the important concept
known as monotonicity in the game theory literature. We formalize it as follows. A hierarchical
organisation (N;T; f) is monotonic if for any task prole x = (x1; :::; xn) and y = (y1; :::; yn) such
that x  y, f (x)  f (y). Throughout the paper, we assume that organizations are monotonic.
Another interpretation of an organization (N;T; f) is that each worker has a "xed" role, and in
a prole x = (x1; x2; ::; xn), xi measures the number of hours worked by a worker i. In this case, one
can dene T = fT0; :::; Tjg where xi 2 T0 means that worker i has worked 0 hours or is unemployed.
The task prole corresponding to inaction is therefore x = (0; 0; :::; 0). In our tournament model
dened in the next section, workers compete for higher-ranked positions if the rst interpretation
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of an organization is followed, whereas in the second interpretation, workers compete for more work
time within their predetermined role (as would be the case for instance in a soccer team). We mostly
follow the rst interpretation, but all our results are valid if the second interpretation instead is
followed.
We also note that the production function f of an organization (N;T; f) may not be known a
priori, which would justify the use of trial-based tournaments to extract information on workers
relative performance or comparative advantage. In fact, if f were known, then a manager would
simply need to choose the optimal labor allocation5 and therefore would not need to try workers. It
follows that our model of a trial-based tournament in the next section assumes that the production
function of an organization is not known a priori by its manager. Also, that model is also valid for
non-monotonic organizations too. The monotonicity assumption is only needed in Section 4 where
we examine how tournament rank predicts earning.
3 A Trial-Based Tournament
3.1 Model
We propose a simple model of trial-based tournament in hierarchical organizations as follows. Let
r be a vacant position in a hierarchical organization (N;T; f), and p and q two candidates for
that position. p and q maybe current employees employed a lower level s (r > s > 1), or outside
candidates, thus occupying position 1. p is rst tried out at r, and then swaps with q, who is tried
in turn. In practice, the trial might last a certain period of time. Each of the other workers keeps
the same position across trials. The winner is the job candidate whose trial has the greatest positive
e¤ect on aggregate output no matter how labor was allocated among the other workers.
If p beats q, we say that p is locally more inuential (or more productive) than q in job r relative
to job s, or simply that p is more (r; s)  inuential than q, and we denote this by p (r;s) q. We say
that p is globally more inuential than q if p is more (r; s)  inuential than q for any tasks s and r
, and this is denoted by p  q. Therefore,  yields the global ranking of the tournament.
Our comparative approach to evaluating worker productivity therefore yields relative measures
of performance that allow to rank workers for each job. These relations are more formally dened
below. We denote by ep = (0; :::; 0; 1; 0; :::; 0) the pth unit n-component vector.
Denition 1 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p and q two workers.
1) Let s and r be two tasks such that r > s. p is said to be more (r; s)  inuential than q, denoted
p (r;s) q, if: 8x 2 TN such that xp = xq = s, f(x+ (r   s)ep)  f(x+ (r   s)eq).
2) p is said to be more globally inuential than q, denoted p  q, if: p (r;s) q for all s; r 2 T
such that r > s.
The symmetric and asymmetric components of each relation (r;s) are denoted by (r;s)and (r;s),
respectively, and those of the relation  by  and , respectively.
Several features of our model of a trial-based tournament should be highlighted. According
to the denition, p is more (r; s)  inuential than q if the output achieved by the organization
5Note that since the set TN is nite, an optimal labor allocation for any function f always exists.
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after moving p from s to r in any labor allocation x in which p and q are occupying s (that is,
f(x + (r   s)ep)) is always greater than if q instead of p is moved from s to r, which is translated
by f(x + (r   s)ep)  f(x + (r   s)eq).6 Interestingly, the domination relation (r;s), by providing
a measure of relative performance in job r relative to job s, can be used to assess the comparative
advantage of each worker in each job. In fact, if a worker p dominates another worker q in a job r
relative to a lower-ranked job s, it implies that q dominates p in s relative to r. In other words, if p
has a comparative advantage over q in r relative to s, then q has a comparative advantage over p in
s relative to r. It follows that a worker cannot have a comparative advantage over another worker in
r relative to s and in s relative to r simultaneously, even if he is more competent in both positions
in absolute terms.
It is also useful to remark that in a labor allocation x, the input of a worker is not measured, and
it might be hard to measure in real-world organizations. We only observe the position of each worker
and the organizations output f(x). If a worker p occupying position s in x is moved to a position r,
resulting in allocation x+ (r   s)ep and aggregate output f(x+ (r   s)ep), we will be unable to tell
whether the marginal change in the output, which is f(x+(r s)ep) f(x), is attributable to the only
action of p. In fact, if the marginal change in the output is positive, it may be that moving p from
his old position to the new one has motivated other workers to work harder or created better social
interactions, translating into higher aggregate output. Our methodology therefore acknowledges
the fact that individual inputs might be very hard to measure (as also acknowledged by Lazear
(1995)), and relies only on workerspositions and aggregate output to assess relative performance
and comparative advantage in each job. In this sense, our approach can be used to compare workers
even when their absolute productivity cannot be observed.
Another feature of our model is that it can be viewed as a mechanism to collect information on
job applicants. As noted above, there might be noise in the applicantsperformance or in other team
membersperformance, making it hard to evaluate an applicants ability or "absolute" contribution
to the organization. The use of Shapley value in Section 4, however, addresses part of this issue, as
the Shapley value can be viewed as measuring absolute performance.
The following example illustrate the ordinal measures of performance given above.
Example 1 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) involves three workers 1, 2, and 3 and three task
types. The range of its production function is f0; 2g, and the isoquants are dened as follows: Q(2) =
fx 2 TN : (3; 1; 1)  x or (2; 3; 1)  x or (2; 2; 1)  xg, and Q(0) = fx 2 TN : x  (2; 2; 2) or
x  (1; 3; 3) or x  (2; 1; 3) g.
We derive the following structure of productivity rank among the workers:
1 (2;1) 2, 1 (2;1) 3, 2 (2;1) 3; 1 (3;1) 2, 1 (3;1) 3, 2 (3;1) 3; 1 (3;2) 2, 1 (3;2) 3, 2 (3;2) 3;
and 1  2, 1  3, 2  3.
For instance, we note that workers 1 and 2 have the same comparative advantage in tasks 2
relative to task 1, but globally, 1 dominates 2, and 2 dominates 3.
We also dene below an ordinal measure of productivity via a xed allocation of labor.
6 If one assumes that there are exogenous shocks to productivity that a¤ect aggregate output, f(x) can be interpreted
as the average output of the organization corresponding to the labor allocation x. Similarly, if a worker p is moved
from an initial position s to a higher position r, the aggregate output of the organization is likely to uctuate during
the trial period, and in this case, f(x+ (r   s)ep) is the average output of the organization during that period.
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Denition 2 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, p and q two workers and x 2 TN .
Let s and r be two tasks such that r > s. p is said to be more (r; s)  inuential than q via x,
denoted p (r;s;x) q, if: xp = xq = s and f(x+ (r   s)ep)  f(x+ (r   s)eq).
The symmetric and asymmetric components of each of these relations are denoted by (r;s;x)and
(r;s;x), respectively.
The binary relations (r;s;x) are useful to the sources of the comparisons given by the relations
(r;s) and . If a worker p is strictly more (r; s)  inuential than another worker q, for instance,
then we can decompose the ranking p (r;s) q by the binary relations (r;s;x) to identify those labor
allocations x via which p (r;s;x) q and those via which p (r;s;x) q.
3.2 Some Useful Classes of Organizations
We now introduce some popular classes of organizations. We dene linear organizations, von
Neumann-Morgenstern organizations, and top-down biased organizations.
A linear organization is one in which workers can be completely ranked following the trial-based
tournament. The notion of linearity is formally dened below.
Denition 3 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) is said to be linear if the global inuence relation
 is reexive, transitive and complete.
An example of a linear organization is the organization dened in Example 1. Pay di¤erences
between workers can be rationalized by the notion of linearity in the sense that higher-ranked workers
should earn more.
We also dene the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations, which are organizations
that have only two layers of the hierarchy.
Denition 4 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) is said to be von Neumann-Morgenstern if jT j =
2.
Familiar readers can remark that when jT j = 2 for an organization (N;T; f), the aggregate output
function f can be shown to be equivalent to the notion of a transferable utility function introduced by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In the standard denition, there is a function which maps
a coalition into its worth. Within our framework, such a coalition is replaced by the task prole
x = (x1; :::; xn) where xp 2 f1; 2g; xp = 1 means that worker p is outside of the coalition, and xp = 2
means that worker p is inside.
This class of functions constitutes the cornerstone of game theory. It is also used by Shapley
and Shubik (1967) to illustrate production in a wide class of economies in the real world. Although
very popular, this class of functions may not provide an accurate description of certain real-world
organizations, as organizations usually have several layers of hierarchy (e.g., academic departments
in certain countries have three levels, where a faculty member is either an assistant, associate or full
professor) or di¤erent levels of involvement (e.g., the number of working hours).
The third class of organizations is called top-down biased. These are organizations in which
workers who are dominant at intermediate levels are also dominant at the top level or at the bottom
level. We formally dene this notion below.
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Denition 5 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) is said to be top-down biased if for any tasks r
and s such that r > s, and for any x 2 TN , (r;s;x)(k;1;x)or (r;s;x)(j;k;x) for some k such that
1 < k < j.
The class of top-down biased organizations is extremely large. We will show that it strictly
includes the large class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations and the class of three-layer
organizations. We will also show that top-down biased organizations e¤ectively discriminate between
workers of di¤erent qualities in terms of earnings.
4 Tournament Rank and Earnings
In this section, we study the relationship between tournament rank and earnings as determined by
marginal productivity. As we argued in the introduction, marginal productivity in our environment is
measured by the Shapley value (see, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1967) for von Neumann-Morgenstern
organizations). We adapt Freixas(2005a) generalization of the Shapley value to our environment.
4.1 Denition of the Shapley Value
Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and fz1; z2; :::; zkg the range of f . Without loss of
generality, we assume z1 > z2 > ::: > zk. Denote by QN the set of all the bijections dened from N
onto f1; :::; ng. An element of QN is a possible order in which workers are hired in the organization
(workers move from a type T1 task to another task type or they stay in T1). QN and TN are
probabilistic spaces. The probability of a given order is assumed to be 1n! and that of a given task
prole is assumed to be 1jn . A worker is assigned any of the j representative tasks or jobs in the
organization with probability 1j . An ordered labor allocation of N is an ordered pair R =
 
sR; xR

;
where sR 2 QN and xR 2 TN . In other words, an ordered labor allocation R species an order in
which workers are hired (i.e. sR) and an allocation of workers to the tasks (i.e. xR). The space of all
ordered labor allocations QN TN is a probabilistic space, with all ordered labor allocations having
an equal probability 1n!jn .
The i-pivotal worker of R for i = 1; 2; :::; k 1, denoted by i-piv(R; f), is uniquely dened either
as:
(a): the worker whose action in R clinches the outcome of xR under at least the output level zi,
or
(b): the worker whose action in R clinches the outcome of xR under at most the output level
zi+1.
In other words, i-piv(R; f) is the rst worker in sR who satises one of the two following mutually
exclusive conditions:
(1) independently of how tasks are allocated among all subsequent workers, the outcome will be
fh with fh  fi, or
(2) no matter how all subsequent workers were to change their actions, the nal outcome would
be no greater than fi+1.
For every i 2 f1; 2; :::; k   1g, denote by R+ip (f) the set of all the ordered labor allocations for
which worker p is i-pivotal. The Shapley value of a worker p is the weighted average number of
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ordered labor allocations in which p is i-pivotal for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; k  1g. The formal denition
is below:
Denition 6 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p a worker. The Shapley value of p
is:
p (f) =
1
n!jn (z1)
k 1X
i=1
(zi   zi+1)
R 2 QN  TN : p = i-piv (R; f)	 :
As an application of this denition, we compute the Shapley value of each worker in Example 2,
nding that this value is 4427 for worker 1,
8
27 for worker 2, and
2
27 for worker 3. We note that these
values agree with the productivity ranking induced by the global inuence relation.
We answer the question of whether earnings as measured by the Shapley value strictly reect
productivity rank. In other words, does a more productive workers always earn more than a less
productive worker? The answer is "no" in general, especially if the number of layers of hierarchy is
more than three. We illustrate this point through the example below.
Example 2 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) involves two workers and four tasks. Its production
function is dened in the table below.
profile of task (x) f(x)
(1; 1) 0
(2; 1) 0
(3; 1) 0
(4; 1) 0
(2; 1) 0
(1; 3) 0
(1; 4) 0
(2; 2) 0
(3; 2) 1
(4; 2) 1
(2; 3) 0
(2; 4) 1
(3; 3) 1
(4; 3) 1
(3; 4) 1
(4; 4) 1
We note that worker 1 is strictly more productive than worker 2, but the Shapley value is 12 for
each of them. Therefore, the Shapley sharing rule does not always reward productivity.
4.2 When do Earnings Strictly Reect Tournament Rank?
We characterize organizations in which earnings as measured by the Shapley value strictly reect
tournament rank.
The following proposition states that equally ranked workers have the same pay.
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Proposition 1 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p; q 2 N two workers. Then,
p  q =) p (f) = q (f)
In order to prove our second result, we need the lemma below shown in Pongou, Tchantcho and
Tedjeugang (2015). It states that a more productive worker is more frequently pivotal than a less
productive worker.
Lemma 1 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p; q 2 N two workers. Then, p  q =)R+ip  R+iq for any i 2 f1; : : :; k   1g.
It follows from Lemma 1 that a more productive worker cannot earn less than a less productive
worker, as shown below.
Proposition 2 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p; q 2 N two workers. Then,
p  q =) p (f)  q (f) .
The message of Proposition 2 is encouraging. However, it does not solve the problem arising
from the possibility of two workers earning the same wage despite having di¤erent productivities
(Example 2). Our main goal is to characterize organizations for which the performance structure
and the wage structure coincide. The following result states that relative performance is adequately
rewarded in top-down biased organizations.
Theorem 1 Let (N;T; f) be a top-down biased hierarchical organization, and p; q 2 N two workers.
Then,
p  q =) p (f) > q (f) .
4.3 Equivalence between Tournament Rank and Pay Rank
In this section, we show tournament rank and pay rank coincide for linear and top-down biased
organizations. Denote by S the preorder induced on the set of workers by the Shapley value. This
preorder is total and ranks workers according to their pay. We have the following result:
Theorem 2 Let (N;T; f) be a linear and top-down biased hierarchical organization.  and S
coincide (that is, p  q () p (f) > q (f) and p  q () p (f) = q (f)).
We note that Theorem 2 on the equivalence between payment ranking and performance ranking
has several practical implications. First, performance ranking, captured by the global inuence
relation, implies that higher-ranked workers occupy higher-level positions in the organization. Note
that our tournament model compares the relative performance of workers in each job relative to a
lower-ranked job and implies that a globally more performant worker should be placed in a higher-
level position. In this sense, our tournament model di¤ers from the traditional tournament theory
which focuses only one job and the promotion of only one worker. Second, the fact that more
performant workers earn more in top-down biased organizations (Theorems 1 and 2) therefore means
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that workers placed in higher-level positions are better treated, which is consistent with the spirit
of tournament theory. Third, Theorem 2 implies that wage dispersion is possible among workers in
the same layer of an organization. In fact, if the number of workers is greater than the number of
layers, it is clear that at least one layer will have workers of di¤erent (relative) performance. Given
that performance determines pay (Theorems 1 and 2), workers occupying the same layer may earn
di¤erent salaries.
An important implication of Theorem 2 is that in all linear von Neumann-Morgenstern organi-
zations the tournament rank and the pay rank coincide.
Proposition 3 Let (N;T; f) be a linear von Neumann-Morgenstern organization.  and S coin-
cide.
The proof follows from the fact that all von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations are top-down
biased.
We also show that tournament rank and pay rank coincide in three-layer linear organizations due
to the fact that these organizations are top-down biased.
Proposition 4 Let (N;T; f) be a three-layer linear organization.  and S coincide.
As already mentioned, Propositions 2 and 3 are proved by simply showing that von Neumann-
Morgenstern organizations and three-layer organizations are top-down biased. It follows that top-
down biased organizations are numerous in real life. For instance, all the practical organizations
studied in Shapley and Shubik (1967) are von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations, and so are top-
down biased. These organizations include organizations where only labor, or both labor and capital,
are used in the production process. Shapley and Shubik (1967) assume that a worker either works or
does not work, or a capital is used or is not used (that is, jT j = 2). Their framework therefore does
not acknowledge the fact that the level of involvement in the production process might di¤er across
workers within an organization. In real-life organizations, some individuals might work full time,
others part time, and others might not work (which is a three-layer organization). Our framework
covers the framework of Shapley and Shubik (1967) as well as situations where workers have more
exibility in their work schedule or in the amount of work time (that is, jT j = j  2).
The fact that certain organizations that have more than three layers are not top-down biased
has practical implications for the design of organizations that promote fairness in pay. Theorem
2 implies that fair organizations should not have too many layers. Of course, there always exist
top-down biased organizations of any number of layers. But since one cannot anticipate whether an
organization will top-down biased if one allows it to have more than three layers, it is better to allow
two or three layers to always guarantee that pay strictly reects tournament rank, which implies
fairness in compensation.
Interestingly, as noted in the introduction, Theorems 1-2 and Propositions 1-3 all hold when we
replace the Shapley value by the Banzhaf value. Results are available and will be included in the
present draft upon request. We have chosen not to include those results for expositional purposes. We
also remark that concepts other than the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value exist in the literature.
However, they have not been generalized to our framework yet, which is one reason why we do not
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study them. Our goal was not to generalize those other values. Our focus on the Shapley value is
justied by the fact that it is the only value that is regarded as measuring marginal productivity.
Our choice is therefore natural in the context of market organizations.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a simple model of trial-based tournament, a widespread mechanism used by or-
ganizations to hire and organize workers. This mechanism consists of pitting workers against each
other by trying them at the job they would like to get. We derive specic measures of relative perfor-
mance that allow to rank workers for each job and assess their comparative advantage when absolute
performance cannot be observed and when the production process is characterized by complex and
unmeasurable social interactions and externalities.
We have also studied the relationship between tournament rank and earnings as determined by
marginal productivity. Marginal productivity in our environment is measured by the Shapley value
(Freixas (2005a)). The Shapley value as a compensation scheme is justied if the allocation of work-
ers to the tasks is somewhat random (Doeringer and Piore (1971), Reder (1955)), maybe due to
exogenous factors, or due to the fact that the production function is not entirely known to the man-
ager so that experimentation in labor allocation becomes useful, as is the case in most sports teams.
We have found that the Shapley value only weakly reects tournament rank. Hence, a weak violation
of fairness in pay is possible. Our main result is to provide a characterization of organizations for
which pay and tournament rank have the same ordinal structure. These organizations are linear and
top-down biased in the sense that they discriminate between workers mostly in case of promotion to
the highest level or in case of ring. This class of organizations is extremely large, and it includes
important subclasses, such as the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern organizations and the class of
three-layer organizations. The ndings imply that organizations that promote fairness in earnings
should not have too many layers.
Our analysis also extends to compensation schemes that do not reward workers based on their
marginal productivity. For instance, consider a hierarchical organization (N;T; f), and the following
compensation scheme of the organizations revenue:
wp(f) =
(p(f))
xX
q2N
(q(f))
x
where wp(f) is the payo¤ to worker p under the sharing rule w, p(f) is worker ps earnings
measured by the Shapley value, but expressed as the fraction of the organizations total revenue
that goes to p, and x a strictly positive real number. We can show that w is a rank-preserving
transformation of  in that if p earns more than q under the  rule, then p earns more than q under
the w rule, and vice-versa. If x = 1, then wp(f) = p(f) for any p, which implies the same wage
gap under the w rule as under the Shapley compensation scheme. If x < 1, then the wage gap
between workers is smaller under the w rule than under the  rule, with workers at the bottom of
the organization ladder earning more than their marginal product, and those at the top earning less.
This is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton progressive tax system in which income is transferred from
workers at higher levels to those below them to achieve more equality (Sen (1973)). Some scholars
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argue that within organizations, such a revenue-sharing mechanism might promote harmony and
more cooperative behavior (see, e.g., Lazear (1989)). On the other hand, if x > 1, then the wage
gap between workers at di¤erent levels of the organization ladder is greater under the w rule than
under the  rule, with workers at the bottom earning less than their marginal product, and those
at the top earning more. This is consistent with the notion of prize spread in tournament theory,
which implies large wage increases upon promotions, and which is intended to motivate workers at
each level of the hierarchy and those at lower levels (Lazear (1995)).
To be more concrete, let us examine an application to Example 1. If the organizations revenue
is redistributed according to the Shapley rule, worker 1 will earn about 81.5% of the total output,
worker 2 14.8%, and worker 3 3.7%. However, if one wants to narrow the income gap, one could
apply one of the w rules above, choosing x = 12 for instance. The output share would then become
61% for worker 1, 26% for worker 2, and 13% for worker 3, indeed narrowing the income gap between
workers. If, on the contrary, one wants to increase the income gap between workers, one could choose
x = 2, leading to the output share of 96.6% for worker 1, 3.2% for worker 2, and 0.2% for worker 3.
In general, since under the w rule, x can take on any value, there are innitely many trans-
formations of the Shapley value that either redistribute income away from workers at higher levels
towards those at lower levels, or alternatively, increase the income gap across the layers of hierarchy.
Hence, under the assumptions of Theorem 2, these compensation schemes strictly reect tournament
rank.
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6 Proofs
6.1 Proposition 1
Proof. If p  q, then p and q are interchangeable in any task prole, hence p and q have the same
Shapley value.
A few notation, denitions and preliminary results will be needed for the other proofs.
Let R =
 
sR; xR

be an ordered labor allocation. Let p be a worker. Rjp = (sR
j
p; xR
j
p) is the
ordered labor allocation in which the order in which workers enter the organization coincides with
that of R (i.e. sRjp = sR) and worker p as well as any worker q who enters before p occupies the
exact same position as in R (i.e. xR
j
p
q = xRq if sR (q)  sR (p)) whereas workers who enter after p
are assigned the highest position (i.e. xR
j
p
q = j if sR (q) > sR (p)). Similarly, R1p =

sR1p; x
R1p

is the
ordered labor allocation in which the order in which workers enter the organization coincides with
that of R (i.e. sR1p = sR) and worker p as well as any worker q who enters before p occupies the
exact same position as in R (i.e. x
R1p
q = xRq if sR (q)  sR (p)) whereas workers who enter after p
are assigned the lowest position (i.e. x
R1p
q = 1 if sR (q) > sR (p)). These denitions are formalized in
Notation 1 below, where we also dene the set of all ordered labor allocations in which a worker is
pivotal.
Notation 1 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, R =
 
sR; xR

an ordered labor allocation,
and p a worker.
i) We denote by Rjp = (sR
j
p; xR
j
p) the ordered labor allocation dened by:
sRjp = sR; and 8q 2 N; xR
j
p
q =
(
xRq if sR (q)  sR (p)
j if sR (q) > sR (p) .
ii) We denote by R1p =

sR1p; x
R1p

the ordered labor allocation dened by:
sR1p = sR; and for all q 2 N , x
R1p
q =
(
xRq if sR (q)  sR (p)
1 if sR (q) > sR (p) .
iii) For any i = 1; 2; : : :; k   1, R+ip (f) denotes the set of all the ordered labor allocations for
which worker p is i-pivotal. We pose:
Rp (f) =
k 1[
i=1
R+ip (f) .
6.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that p  q. It follows from Lemma 1 that
R+ip  R+iq for any i 2 f1; :::; k   1g :
But
p (f) =
1
n!jn (z1)
k 1X
i=1
(zi   zi+1)
R+ip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and
q (f) =
1
n!jn (z1)
k 1X
i=1
(zi   zi+1)
R+iq :
Given that
R+ip  R+iq for any i 2 f1; :::; k   1g, it follows that p (f)  q (f).
6.3 Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1 requires a denition and a preliminary result.
Denition 7 Let (N;T; f) be a hierarchical organization, and p; q 2 N two workers.
1) Let x; y 2 TN be two task proles.y is said to agree with x but at fp; qg if:
8h 2 N r fp; qg ; xh = yh and yp = yq.
We denote by TNx (p; q) the set of all task proles which agree with x but at fp; qg.
2) (N;T; f) is said to satisfy condition C1 if for any task prole x such that xp = xq = s :
8r 6= s; f(x+ (r   s)ep) 6= f(x+ (r   s)eq)
=) 9y 2 TNx (p; q) :
8><>:
f (y + (1  s)ep) 6= f (y + (1  s)eq)
or
f (y + (j   s)ep) 6= f (y + (j   s)eq)
We have the following straightforward lemma.
Lemma 2 A hierarchical organization (N;T; f) is top-down biased if and only if it satises condition
C1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let (N;T; f) be a top-down biased hierarchical organization. Suppose that p  q, and let
us show that p (f) > q (f). Since 8i 2 f1; :::; k   1g,
R+ip  R+iq, it su¢ ces to prove that there
exists some i 2 f1; :::; k   1g such that
R+ip > R+iq. We will then determine an i 2 f1; :::; k   1g
for which  pq : R+iq  ! R+ip is not surjective.
p  q is equivalent to p  q and not(q  p) by denition. The following implication is true:
not (q  p) =)
(
9x 2 TN ; xp = xq = s s 2 f2; :::; jg ;
9r > s; f(x+ (r   xp) ep) = zl > fm = f (x) and f(x+ (r   xq) eq) < zl
which implies
f(x+ (r   xq) eq) < f(x+ (r   xp) ep).
It therefore follows that
f(x+ (r   xq) eq) 6= f(x+ (r   xp) ep).
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Under condition C1, it follows that there exists y 2 TNx (p; q) such that:
f (y + (1  yp) ep) 6= f (y + (1  yq) eq) or f (y + (j   yp) ep) 6= f (y + (j   yq) eq) .
Without loss of generality, suppose that f (y + (j   yp) ep) 6= f (y + (j   yq) eq). Given that
p  q, we have
f (y + (j   yp) ep) < f (y + (j   yq) eq) .
Pose yp = yq = s. Let r  s. Then, because p  q, we have:
f (y + (r   yp) ep)  f (y + (r   yq) eq) .
Therefore
f(y + (r   yp) ep)  f(y + (r   yq) eq)  f(y + (j   yq) eq) > f(y + (j   yp) ep).
Pose f(y + (j   yq) eq) = yi. Then i 2 f1; :::; k   1g. Consider 	pq : R+iq  ! R+ip.
Let us nd R 2 Rip such that R has no preimage through  pq. Remark that the possible preimages
of R 2 Rip are Rpq and R0pq.
We will therefore nd R 2 Rip such that Rpq =2 Riq and R0pq =2 Riq.
Consider an ordered labor allocation R =
 
sR;xR

such that sR (p) = n and xR = y+(r   yp) ep.
Then, R 2 Rip because
f
 
xR
  zi
and
f(xR
j
p +

j   xR
j
p
p

ep) = f(y + (j   yp) ep) < zi
a) Suppose Rpq =2 Riq.
In fact,
sRpq (q) = n; x
Rpq = y + (r   yq) eq
and
x(Rpq)
j
q +

j   x(Rpq)
j
q
q

eq = y + (j   yq) eq
and
f(y + (j   yq) eq) = zi  zi.
That is,
f
 
xRpq
  zi and f(x(Rpq)jq + j   x(Rpq)jqq  eq)  zi.
b) Suppose R0pq =2 Riq
In fact,
xR
0
pq = y + (r   yp) ep.
Hence
f

xR
0
pq

 zi.
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But because r  s, we have:
x
(R0pq)
j
q +
 
j   x(R
0
pq)
j
q
q
!
eq = y + (j   yq) eq + (r   yp) ep > y + (j   yq) eq.
Hence
f(x
(R0pq)
j
q +
 
j   x(R
0
pq)
j
q
q
!
eq)  zi
because
f(y + (j   yq) eq + (r   yp) ep)  f(y + (j   yq) eq) = zi.
We then conclude that R has no preimage through  pq. Therefore,  pq is not surjective, and
hence, jiRpj > jiRqj.
Given that (
8j 2 f1; :::; k   1g; jjRpj  jjRqj and
9i 2 f1; :::; k   1g : jiRpj > jiRqj
it follows that
p (f) =
1
n!jn (z1)
k 1X
i=1
(zi   zi+1)
R+ip > 1n!jn (z1)
k 1X
i=1
(zi   zi+1)
R+iq = q (f) .
6.4 Theorem 2
Proof. Assume that an organization is linear and top-down biased. The fact that  and S coincide
immediately follows from Propositions 2 and 3 and from the fact that  is total.
6.5 Propositions 3 and 4
Proof. Let (N;T; f) be a linear hierarchical organization such that jT j = 2 or jT j = 3. It su¢ ces to
show (N;T; f) is top-down biased.
We will show only the case of jT j = 3.
Let x 2 TN and p; q 2 N such that xp = xq = s.
Let r 6= s such that
f(x+ (r   xp) ep) 6= f(x+ (r   xq) eq).
Find y 2 TNx (p; q) such that
f (y + (1  yp) ep) 6= f (y + (1  yq) eq) or f (y + (j   yp) ep) 6= f (y + (j   yq) eq) .
Case 1: Suppose that s = 1 and r 2 f2; 3g.
- If r = 2, then f (x+ (t2   xp) ep) 6= f (x+ (t2   xq) eq).
Pose y 2 TN such that yp = yq = 2; ya = xa for any a 2 N r fp; qg.
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It follows that
y 2 TNx (p; q) and y + (1  yp) ep = x+ (t2   xq) eq
and
y + (1  yq) eq = x+ (t2   xp) ep.
Given that
f (x+ (t2   xp) ep) 6= f (x+ (t2   xq) eq)
it follows that
f (y + (1  yp) ep) 6= f (y + (1  yq) eq) .
- If r = 3, then f (x+ (t3   xp) ep) 6= f (x+ (t3   xq) eq). We can take y = x.
Case 2: Suppose that s = 2 and r 2 f1; 3g.
- If r = 1, then f (x+ (1  xp) ep) 6= f (x+ (1  xq) eq), and we take y = x.
- If r = 3, then f (x+ (t3   xp) ep) 6= f (x+ (t3   xq) eq), and we take y = x.
Case 3: Suppose that s = 3 and r 2 f1; 2g.
- If r = 1; then we take y = x:
- If r = 2, then pose y 2 TN such that yp = yq = t2; ya = xa for any a 2 N r fp; qg.
We have
y 2 TNx (p; q) and y + (j   yp) ep = x+ (t2   xq) eq
and
y + (j   yq) eq = x+ (t2   xp) ep.
Given that
f (x+ (t2   xq) eq) 6= f (x+ (t2   xp) ep)
it follows that
f(y + (j   yp) ep) 6= f(y + (j   yq) eq).
We conclude that any hierarchical organization (N;T; f) such that jT j = 3 satises condition C1.
Following Lemma 2, we conclude that (N;T; f) is top-down biased.
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